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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
STATE'S INTEREST IN INVESTIGATING SUBVERSION
QUESTIONED
Uphaus v. Wyman
350 U.S. 72 (1959)
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Willard
Uphaus for contempt of court for refusing to produce a list of the guests
who had attended a camp operated by the World Fellowship, Inc., of which
Uphaus was executive director. The demand for the list was made by the
Attorney General of New Hampshire during an investigation, pursuant to
legislative authorization, into possible subversive activities within the state.'
Speaking for five members of the Court, Mr. Justice Clark held (1)
that although the Smith Act2 pre-empts local statutes which proscribe the
same conduct, it does not bar state prosecutions for or investigations of
sedition against the state itself,3 and (2) that Uphaus was not denied due
process of law in the contempt conviction. While public disclosure of the
names of members of an unpopular group has a deterrent effect on the
members' freedom of association, the Court felt that the state's interest in
defending against subversion justifies interfering, to a certain extent, with
the rights of private individuals.4
The opinion did not consider the doctrine that first amendment rights
occupy a preferred position in the hierarchy of constitutional freedoms.5
1 Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
2 18 U.S.C., § 2385 (1956).
3 For a discussion of this part of the decision, see Schwartz, "The Supreme Court-
October 1959 Term," 58 Mich. L. Rev. 165 at 178 (1959).
4 For authority that freedom of association is among the liberties protected by
due process, see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1959); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516 (1945); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
The Court relied in part on a state statute which requires public camps to maintain
a guest register open to inspection of police officers and sheriffs. The Court reasoned
that the associational privacy sought to be maintained by Uphaus was public at its
inception and "tenuous at best." 360 U.S. at 80. The reason that the state did not
use this statute instead of compulsory process was not indicated.
Appellant argued that the due process clause also precluded enforcement of the
subpoenas because the resolution which authorized the operations of the Attorney
General was vague and the documents sought were not relevant to the inquiry. The
Court lumped all the above objections into the single question of whether New Hamp-
shire was precluded from compelling the production of the documents by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 360 U.S. at 77.
Uphaus further argued that the indefinite sentence was a denial of due process;
the Court rejected the contention because it had determined that the committee's
demand for the documents was legitimate. 360 U.S. at 81.
r The first statement of this doctrine was in a footnote by Mr. Justice Stone; see
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938).
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Although these rights have been given special consideration in certain cases,6
It has been fairly clear since Dennis v. United States,1 that the present
Court does not readily attribute this "preferred position" to first amendment
freedoms. There is reason to believe that the Court never did completely
accept the doctrine.8 However, irrespective of the historical importance of
this doctrine, the result is that today there is no presumption or inference
in favor of the individual when his interests are balanced against those of
the state. Now the state is only required to show a compelling societal
interest to justify action which restricts the exercise of these freedoms.9
Whether first amendment freedoms occupy a preferred or an equal posi-
tion, the decision in the instant case is susceptible to criticism on its basic
premise that the state's interest in the investigation of subversive activities
is a compelling societal interest sufficient to subordinate first amendment
rights. The Court apparently did not question, but rather assumed, that
subversion against the state'0 is a compelling societal interest. The facts of
this case do not appear to warrant such an assumption.
Before reaching this conclusion several factors should have been con-
sidered. First, it does not seem possible that a state government could be
overthrown by force or violence as long as the federal government is in its
present form. The F. B. I. and other federal agencies such as the armed
forces almost certainly could and would prevent such an attempt. Second,
even if it were possible to take control of the state by force, the "subversives"
would have no reason for doing so. They could not improve their overall
position in the United States because, obviously, the federal government
would easily be able to remove them from power in New Hampshire.
Furthermore, such a grasp for power would result in the prosecution of all
people involved. This would most likely destroy any organization which
might exist in New Hampshire. In other words, a state subversive organiza-
tion would not strike until it was reasonably sure that it could seize control
on a national level also. Therefore, as long as federal agencies do their jobs
well, subversion against a state appears to be a fruitless and unlikely
endeavor.
Under this analysis, it does not seem that the World Fellowship camp
was a real threat to the security of New Hampshire. Also, because it is
6 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (Concurring Opinion); see,
e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
95-96 (1940); Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
7 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
8 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., takes this view in
a concurring opinion).
) NAACP v. Alabama, supra note 4; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1958);
Dennis v. United States, supra note 7.
10 This assumption would be valid in circumstances of a purely local nature such
as a strike or political corruption, but this criticism is directed at the Court's drawing
of the conclusion in circumstances similar to those of the instant case only, i.e., where
the activity being investigated is thought to originate in a foreign country and to
threaten the security of the entire United States. Also, it is not relevant to cases of
actual breaches of the peace where the state dearly has authority to act.
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clear that first amendment rights were infringed1 and that an actual attempt
to overthrow the government of a state was extremely unlikely, the Court
should have closely examined the state's interest in "self-preservation"
instead of automatically assuming it was a compelling societal interest.
Depending on the facts, such an examination could have resulted in
three possible answers. First, the security of the state was seriously threat-
ened. Second, there was no threat to the security of the state because fed-
eral agencies were fully capable of handling the situation. Third, the conduct
complained of did not constitute a threat to the state. The Uphaus case
clearly falls within the second category. Since any threat to the state's
security is greatly diminished by the existence of extensive federal controls,
the state's interest is not of a "compelling" nature. Therefore, it would
seem that first amendment freedoms should have been given greater weight
than those of the state in the balancing process.
Paul J. Stergios
11 If there had been no infringement, the Court would not have found it necessary
to balance the public and private interests.
